An On-line Design of Physical Watermarks by Liu, Hanxiao et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
05
29
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
4 S
ep
 20
18
1
An On-line Design of Physical Watermarks
Hanxiao Liu, Jiaqi Yan, Yilin Mo, Karl Henrik Johansson
Abstract—This paper considers the problem to design physical
watermark signals to protect a control system against replay
attacks. We first define the replay attack model, where an
adversary replays the previous sensory data in order to fool the
system. The physical watermarking scheme, which leverages a
random control input as a watermark, to detect the replay attack
is introduced. The optimal watermark signal design problem
is then proposed as an optimization problem, which achieves
the optimal trade-off between the control performance and
attack detection performance. For the system with unknown
parameters, we provide a procedure to asymptotically derive the
optimal watermarking signal. Numerical examples are provided
to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.
Index Terms—Control, Cyber-Physical Systems(CPS), secure,
replay attack, physical watermark, on-line “learning”.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
YBER-Physical Systems (CPS) are the systems which
offer close integration and combination between compu-
tational elements and physical processes [1]. CPS are also de-
fined as the system where “physical and software components
are deeply intertwined, each operating on different spatial and
temporal scales, exhibiting multiple and distinct behavioral
modalities, and interacting with each other in a myriad of ways
that change with context” [2]. CPS play an important role in
a large variety of fields, such as manufacturing, health care,
environment control, transportation, military and infrastructure
construction, and so on.
Due to the wide applications and critical functions of the
CPS, increasing importance has been attached to the security
of CPS [3], [4]. A successful attack can jeopardize critical
infrastructure and people’s lives and properties, even threaten
national security. In 2010, the Stuxnet malware made a dev-
astating attack on Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges [5],
which motivates the research community to pay more attention
to the secure CPS design and defend mechanisms[6] [7].
However, CPS security faces a wide variety of challenges.
Cardenas et al. [8] discussed three main challenges that the se-
curity of CPS faces and identify the unique properties of CPS
security when compared with traditional IT security. Besides,
security mechanisms capable of CPS are also analyzed and
some new challenges based on the physical model of process
control. Similar discussion can be found in [9]. Gollmann and
Krotofil [10] pointed out that people performing the security
analysis of CPS is also a key challenge. The authors argue
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that it is difficult for people to expertise in cyber and physical
safety and able to appreciate their limitations in their own
domain.
A. Previous Work
The research community has made significant efforts in in-
trusion, failure and anomaly detection to enhance CPS security
in recent years. Zimmer et al. [11] presented three mechanisms
for time-based intrusion detection. The techniques, through
bounds checking, are developed in a self-checking manner by
the application and through the operating system scheduler.
Mitchell and Chen [12] proposed a hierarchical performance
model and techniques for intrusion detection in CPS. They
classified the modern CPS intrusion detection system tech-
niques into two classes: detection technique and audit material
and summarized advantages and disadvantages in [13]. Kwon
et al. [14] discussed the necessary and sufficient conditions
where the attacker could implement attack without being
detected, which can be employed to evaluate vulnerability
degree of certain CPS. And corresponding detection and
defense methodologies against stealthy deception attacks also
can be developed. In [15], the authors proposed a mathe-
matical framework for CPS and investigated limitations of
the fundamental monitoring system. Besides, centralized and
distributed attack detection and identification monitors were
also provided.
In this paper, we consider the detection problem of replay
attack, which is motivated by the Stuxnet malware mentioned
previously. In [16], [17], [18], a replay attack model is defined
and its effect on a steady-state control system is analyzed.
An algebraic condition is provided on the detectability of
the replay attack and for those systems that cannot detect
replay attack efficiently, a physical watermarking scheme is
proposed to enable the detection of the presence of the
attack, by injecting a random control signal, namely watermark
signal, into the control system. However, the watermark signal
will deteriorate the control performance, and therefore it is
important to find the optimal trade-off between the control
performance loss and the detection performance, which can
be casted as an optimization problem. Similar “watermarking”
schemes are also proposed in the literature [19], [20], [21].
Different from the previous additive watermarking schemes,
a multiplicative sensor watermarking scheme is proposed in
[22]. In this scheme, each output is respectively fed to a SISO
watermark generator and due to the inclusion of a watermark
removing functionality, the control performance will not be
sacrificed. Miao et al. [23] proposed the use of non-cooperative
stochastic games to design a suboptimal switching control
policy that balances control performance with the intrusion
detection rate for replay attacks. Hoehn and Zhang [24] pro-
vided a novel technique via injecting non-regular time intervals
2to the system and checking signal processing to detect the
replay attack. Another advantage of the proposed approach is
the possibility of elegant implementation into existing control
systems. Other replay attack detection mechanisms has been
proposed in the literature [25].
It is worth noticing that in the majority of the afore-
mentioned researches, the precise knowledge of the system
parameters is assumed in order to design the detector and
the watermarking signal. However, acquiring the parameters
may be troublesome and costly. Hence, it is beneficial for
the system to “learn” the parameters during its operation and
automatically design the detector and watermarking signal in
real-time. Motivated by this idea, in this paper, we propose a
“learning mechanism” to infer the system parameters as well
as a physical watermark and detector design that asymptoti-
cally converges to the optimal ones.
B. Outline
The goal of this paper is to develop a data-driven ap-
proach to design physical watermark signals to protect a
cyber-physical system with unknown parameters against replay
attack. First, we consider this problem under the condition
of known parameters. The physical watermarking scheme
leverages a random control input as a watermark to detect
replay attack. The watermark signal is designed to achieve
the optimal trade-off between the control performance loss
and attack detection performance. Subsequently, for the system
with unknown parameters, we provide an on-line “learning”
scheme to asymptotically derive the optimal watermarking
signal.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The detection problem of replay attack via “physical wa-
termark” with known system parameters is discussed, and
a countermeasure of designing the watermarking signal
that achieves the optimal trade-off between the control
performance and detection performance is proposed.
2) To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the
detection problem of replay attack via “physical water-
mark” with unknown system parameters is discussed.
3) An on-line “learning” procedure is provided to asymptot-
ically derive the optimal watermarking signal and optimal
detector.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II
formulates the problem by introducing the system as well
as the attack model. The physical watermarking scheme is
introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we present an on-
line “learning” scheme based on the input and output data to
infer the parameters of the system and design the watermark
signal and the detector based on the estimated parameters. We
further prove the almost sure convergence of the watermark
signal to the optimal one. In Section V, numerical example is
provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
Concluding remarks are given in Section VI. Some proofs of
theorems are included in the appendix.
Notations
‖A‖F is the Frobenius norm of an m×n matrix A defined
as ‖A‖F =
√∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1(Ai,j)
2, where Ai,j is the ith row,
jth column element of the matrix A. A⊗B is the Kronecker
product of matrix A and B. A > 0 denotes that the matrix A
is positive definite.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the problem formulation by
introducing cyber-physical system model and the replay attack
model, which will be employed for the rest of this paper.
We consider an linear time-invariant system described by
the following equations:
xk+1 = Axk + wk, (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector at time k, and wk ∈ Rn is
the zero mean Gaussian process noise with covariance Q > 0.
A sensor network monitors the above system. The observa-
tion equation is given by
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
where yk ∈ Rm is the sensor’s measurement at time k.
vk ∈ R
n is the zero mean Gaussian measurement noise with
covariance R > 0.
We assume that w0, w1, · · · and v0, v1, · · · are independent
of each other. Furthermore, since Cyber Physical Systems
usually operate for an extended period of time, it is assumed
that the system is already in the steady state, which means that
x0 is a zero mean Gaussian random vector independent of the
process noise and the measurement noise and with covariance
Σ, where Σ satisfies:
Σ = AΣAT +Q. (3)
We further make the following assumptions regarding the
above system:
Assumption 1. The system is strictly stable. Furthermore,
(A,C) is observable and if system equation (1) has input
matrix B, (A,B) is controllable, which will be used after
the Section III.
Remark 1. The observability and controllability assumption
is without loss of generality as we can perform a Kalman
decomposition [26] and only work with the observable and
controllable subspace.
Remark 2. At first glance it appears that the stability re-
quirement regarding the system matrix A could be strictly.
However, we will show that our formulation can be extended
to closed-loop systems. As a result, the techniques developed
in this work can be used on a closed-loop system equipped
with a stabilizing controller.
Next we introduce the replay attack model. We assume that
the adversary have the following capabilities:
1) The attacker has access to all the real-time sensory
data. In other words, it knows the sensor’s measurement
y0, · · · , yk at time k.
32) The attacker can modify the real sensor signals yk to
arbitrary sensor signals y′k.
Given these capabilities, the adversary can employ the
following replay attack strategy:
1) The attacker records a sequence of sensor measurements
yks from time k1 to k1 + T , where T is large enough to
guarantee that the attacker can replay the sequence for an
extended period of time during the attack.
2) The attacker modifies the sensor measurements yk to the
recorded signals from time k2 to k2 + T , i.e.,
y′k = yk−∆k, ∀ k2 ≤ k ≤ (k2 + T ),
where ∆k = k2 − k1.
Notice that since the system is already in the steady state,
both the replayed signal y′k and the real signal yk from the
sensors will have exactly the same statistics. As a result, for a
large class of linear systems, the replayed signal and the real
signal become indistinguishable after a short transient time
period. In other words, it is useless for the control system
to use χ2 detector to detect anomalies. For more detailed
discussion, please refer to [16].
On the other hand, the harm of the replay attack can be
devastating for CPS, as is shown by the Stuxnet worm. Hence,
it is crucial to detect the presence of the attack. In the next
section, we introduce a detection mechanism using “physical
watermarking”.
III. PHYSICAL WATERMARKING SCHEME
This section is devoted to the detection of replay attack
via physical watermarking. The main idea of physical water-
marking is to inject a random noise φk , which is called the
watermark signal, to excite the system and check whether the
system responds to the watermark signal in accordance to the
dynamical model of the system. Specifically, it is assumed that
the system equation (1) is modified to
xk+1 = Axk + Bφk + wk, (4)
where φk ∈ Rp is the watermark signal applied to the system
at time k, which is usually assumed to be i.i.d. zero mean
Gaussian with covariance U .
In the absence of the attack, yk can be represented as:
yk =
k−1∑
t=0
CAtBφk−1−t +
k−1∑
t=0
CAtwk−1−t + vk + CA
kx0.
For simplicity, we define
γk ,
k∑
t=0
CAtBφk−t,
ϑk ,
k∑
t=0
CAtwk−t + vk+1 + CA
k+1x0,
hence, yk can be rewritten in the following form:
yk = γk−1 + ϑk−1. (5)
Furthermore, we define
Hτ , CA
τB,
hence, it is easy to know that γk−1 is a zero mean Gaussian
whose covariance converges to U , where
U =
∞∑
τ=0
HτUH
T
τ .
Similarly, we can know that ϑk−1 is a zero mean Gaussian
noise whose covariance converges to W = CΣCT +R, where
Σ is defined in (3).
As a result, given φ0, · · · , φk−1, the conditional distribution
of yk converges to a Gaussian distribution with mean γk−1 and
covariance W .
Then let us consider the scenario where the replay attack
exists, the replayed y′k can be written as
y′k = yk−∆k = γk−1−∆k + ϑk−1−∆k
Now since ∆k is unknown to the system operator, it is safe
to assume that given φ0, · · · , φk−1, y′k is zero mean Gaussian
with covariance U + W .
As a result, we can design a detector to differentiate the
distribution of yk under the following two hypotheses:
H0: The sensor measurement yk follows a Gaussian distribu-
tion N0(γk−1,W ).
H1: The sensor measurement yk follows a Gaussian distribu-
tion N1(0,U + W ).
By the Neyman-Pearson lemma [27], the Neyman-Pearson
detector for hypothesis H0 versus hypothesis H1 takes the
following form:
Theorem 1. The Neyman-Pearson detector rejectsH0 in favor
of H1 if
g(yk, φk−1, φk−2, · · · )
=
(
yk − γk−1
)T
W
−1
(
yk − γk−1
)
− yTk (W + U )
−1
yk
≥ζ,
(6)
where ζ is a predetermined threshold which depends on the
desired false alarm rate. Otherwise, hypothesisH0 is accepted.
Remark 3. It is worth noticing that one may take a moving
horizon approach to design an detector, by considering the
distribution of yk, yk−1, · · · , yk−T . However, the proposed
methodology in this paper can be easily extended to multiple
yks case by stacking the state vector.
To characterize the performance of the detector, we adopt
similar expected KL-divergence metrics, as is discussed in
[17], which is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The expected KL divergence of distribution N0
and N1 is
E DKL (N1‖N0) = tr
(
U W
−1
)
−
1
2
log det
(
I + U W −1
)
.
(7)
Furthermore, the expected KL divergence satisfies the inequal-
ity
1
2
tr
(
U W
−1
)
≤ E DKL (N1‖N0)
≤ tr
(
U W
−1
)
−
1
2
log
[
1 + tr
(
U W
−1
)]
.
(8)
4Proof. The proof is similar to the proof in [17] and hence is
omitted due to space limits.
Remark 4. It is worth noticing that the expected KL-
divergence is a convex function of U and hence U . However,
both the upper and lower bounds of it are increasing functions
of tr(U W −1). Hence, in order to optimize the detection
performance, we could instead maximizing tr(U W −1), which
is linear with respect to U .
Note that although the watermark signal can enable the
detection of replay attack, it also deteriorates the performance
of the system to some degree. As a result, it is important to
find the optimal trade-off between the control performance loss
and the detection performance. In this paper, to quantify the
performance loss, we use the following LQG metric:
J = lim
T→+∞
E
(
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
[
yk
φk
]T
X
[
yk
φk
])
, (9)
where
X =
[
Xyy Xyφ
Xφy Xφφ
]
> 0.
Since yk and φk converge to a stationary process, J can be
written in analytical form as
J = lim
k→
tr
(
X Cov
([
yk
φk
]))
= tr
(
X
[
W + U H0U
UHT0 U
])
.
Therefore, J is an affine function of U , which can be written
as
J = J0 +∆J = tr(XyyW ) + tr(XS),
where S as a linear function of U and
S =
[
U H0U
UHT0 U
]
.
Therefore, in order the achieve the optimal trade-off be-
tween the control performance and detection performance, we
can formulate the following optimization problem:
U =arg max
U≥0
tr(U W −1)
subject to tr(XS) ≤ δ, (10)
where δ is a design parameter depending on how much control
performance loss is tolerable.
An important property of the optimization problem (10) is
that the optimal solution is usually a rank-1 matrix, which is
formalized by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The optimization problem (10) is equivalent to
U =arg max
U≥0
tr(UP)
subject to tr(UX ) ≤ δ, (11)
where
P ,
∞∑
τ=0
HTτ W
−1Hτ , (12)
X ,
(
∞∑
τ=0
HTτ XyyHτ
)
+HT0 Xyφ +XφyH0 +Xφφ. (13)
The optimal solution to (11) is
U = zzT ,
where z is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum
eigenvalue of the matrix X−1P and zTX z = δ. Furthermore,
the solution is unique if X−1P has only one maximum
eigenvalue.
Proof. From the definition of U , we know that
tr(U W −1) =
∞∑
k=0
tr
(
HkUH
T
k W
−1
)
=
∞∑
τ=0
tr
(
UHTτ W
−1Hτ
)
= tr (UP) .
Following similar steps as in the above proof, we have that
tr(XS) = tr(UX ). Moreover, since X > 0, we have that
X > 0.
If the optimal U has rank greater than 1, then follow the
same line of argument in the proof of Theorem 7 in [18],
U can be decomposed as U = α1U1 + · · ·αlUl, where the
following holds
1) αi > 0,
∑l
i=1 αi = 1.
2) Ui ≥ 0 is of rank 1 and tr(UiX ) = δ.
Therefore, by the optimality of U , we can conclude that
tr(UP) = tr(U1P) = · · · = tr(UlP),
which shows that the rank one matrix Ui is also optimal.
For optimal rank one U , it can be written as zzT for some
z 6= 0. Hence, the optimization problem (11) is converted to
z =arg max
z 6=0
zTPz
subject to zTX z ≤ δ.
Using the Lagrangian multipliers, one can prove that Pz =
λX z, which shows that z is the eigenvector of X−1P . If we
enumerate all eigenvectors of X−1P , it is not difficult to prove
that the maximum is achieved when z is the eigenvector corre-
sponds to the largest eigenvalue of X−1P and zTX z = δ.
Then we would like to discuss how to generalize the prob-
lem formulation for a closed-loop system with a stabilizing
controller. Consider the following system discussed in [16]:
xk+1 = Axk +B(uk + φk) + wk,
yk = Cxk + vk,
with the following controller:
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +K(yk+1 − CAxˆk),
uk = Lxˆk,
and Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) cost of
J = lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T−1∑
k=0
yTkXyyyk + (uk + φk)
TXφφ(uk + φk)
]
,
where uk denotes the optimal LQG control signal.
5We can redefine the state x˜k and output y˜k as
x˜k =
[
xk
xˆk
]
and y˜k =
[
yk
uk
]
,
and the design of watermarking signal in a closed-loop system
can be converted to the open-loop formulation.
It is worth noticing that in order to design the detector
and the optimal watermarking signal, precise knowledge of
the system parameters is needed. However, acquiring the
parameters may be troublesome and costly. Furthermore, there
may be unforeseen changes in the model of the system, such
as topological changes in the power systems. Therefore, it is
beneficial for the system to “learn” the parameters during its
operation and design the detector and watermarking signal in
real-time, which will be our focus in the next section.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
This section is devoted to developing an on-line “learning”
procedure to infer the system parameters, based on which,
we show how to design watermarking signals and the optimal
detector and prove that the physical watermark and the detector
asymptotically converges to the optimal ones.
Throughout the section, we make the following assump-
tions:
Assumption 2. 1) A is diagonalizable and has distinct
eigenvalues.
2) The maximum eigenvalue of X−1P is unique.
3) The system is not under attack during the “learning”
phase.
4) The system output yk and the dimension of the A matrix
n is known. Furthermore, the matrix X and δ are also
known.
Remark 5. Notice that the mechanism discussed in this sec-
tion is similar to reinforcement learning for Markov Decision
Process (MDP). However, one important distinction is that
only the sensor data yk is observable and the state xk is
hidden. Furthermore, we assume that we need to solve a
constrained optimization problem (16) instead of an uncon-
strained discounted problem usually assumed in MDP.
For the sake of legibility, we first introduce how to infer the
necessary parameters of the system. Subsequently, we move
to the design of the watermark signal and the detector based
on the estimated parameters.
A. Inference on the Parameters
In this subsection, we describe the “learning” procedure.
At each time k, the watermarking signal is chosen to be
φk = U
1/2
k ζk, where ζks are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors
with covariance I . The Uk is computed as a function of
y0, · · · , yk, φ0, · · · , φk−1, the procedure of which will be
described in details in the next subsection.
Consider the optimization problem (11), it is easy to see
that we need to infer the parameter Hτ and W . Then we will
show how to infer these two parameters.
Inference on Hτ
This subsection is devoted to showing how to infer Hk.
First, let us define the following quantity Hk,τ (0 ≤ τ ≤
3n− 2) as
Hk,τ ,
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
ytφ
T
t−τ−1U
−1
t−τ−1.
We assume that φt−τ−1 = 0 if t− τ − 1 < 0. One can think
Hk,τ is an estimate of Hτ .
Then, we start to prove that the Hk,τ converges to Hτ .
Theorem 4. Suppose that there exists positive definite matri-
ces M and M , such that
1
(k + 1)β
M ≤ Uk ≤M, (14)
where 0 ≤ β < 1, then Hk,τ converges to Hτ almost surely.
Proof. Please see the appendix.
Remark 6. It is worth noticing that the only requirement
on Uk to ensure the convergence is that Uk is a function
of y0, y1, · · · , yk and φ0, φ1, · · · , φk−1 and satisfies (14).
The detailed mechanism to generate Uk is not assumed by
Theorem 4.
It is worth noticing that we only keep a record of finitely
many Hk,τ s. However, to infer matrices U , W , P and X , we
needs to estimate Hτ for all τ ≥ 0.
Lemma 1. Assuming the matrix A has distinct eigenvalues
λ1, · · · , λn, then there exists unique Ω1, · · · ,Ωn, such that
Hτ =
n∑
i=1
λτi Ωi. (15)
Proof. From Assumption 2, A can be represented in the
following form:
Aτ = P diag(λτ1 , λ
τ
2 , · · · , λ
τ
n)P
−1
= λτ1P diag(1, 0, · · · , 0)P
−1 + λτ2P diag(0, 1, · · · , 0)P
−1
+ · · ·+ λτnP diag(0, 0, · · · , 1) P
−1
=
n∑
i=1
λτiAi,
where λi denotes the ith eigenvalue of A, and Ai =
P diag(0, · · · , 1i, · · · , 0)P−1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n), i.e., only the ith
diagonal element of Ai is equal to 1, other elements are equal
to 0. Hence, we have
Hτ = CA
τB = C(
n∑
i=1
λτiAi)B =
n∑
i=1
λτi (CAiB)
=
n∑
i=1
λτi Ωi,
which completes the proof.
By Lemma 1 and Cayley-Hamilton theorem1, we could use
finitely many H0, H1, · · · , H3n−2 to estimate both λis and
1For more details about the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, please refer to Chen
[26].
6Ωis and thus Hτ for any τ . To this end, let us consider the
following optimization problem:
min
αk,0,··· ,αk,n−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Hk


αk,0I
αk,1I
· · ·
αk,n−1I

+


Hk,n
Hk,n+1
· · ·
Hk,3n−2


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
F
, (16)
where Hk is a Hankel matrix defined as
Hk ,


Hk,0 Hk,1 · · · Hk,n−1
Hk,1 Hk,2 · · · Hk,n
...
...
. . .
...
Hk,2n−2 Hk,2n−1 · · · Hk,3n−3

 .
Let us denote the roots of the polynomial pk(x) = x
n +
αk,n−1x
n−1 + · · · + αk,0 to be λk,1, · · · , λk,n. Define a
Vandermonde like matrix Vk to be
Vk ,


1 1 · · · 1
λk,1 λk,2 · · · λk,n
...
...
. . .
...
λ3n−2k,1 λ
3n−2
k,2 · · · λ
3n−2
k,n

 ,
and

Ωk,1
...
Ωk,n

 = arg max
Ωk,i
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥(Vk ⊗ Im)


Ωk,1
...
Ωk,n

−

 Hk,0· · ·
Hk,3n−2


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ .
The following theorem further establishes the convergence
of λk,i (and Ωk,i) to λi (and Ωi):
Theorem 5. Suppose that A has distinct eigenvalues. If Hk,τ
converges to Hτ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 3n− 2, then λk,i converges λi
and Ωk,i converges to Ωi.
Before proving Theorem 5, we need to introduce the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose that the vector ϕ is the solution of the
optimization problem
ϕ = arg min
ϕ
‖A(θ)ϕ − b(θ)‖2,
where A(θ) and b(θ) are continuous functions of θ. If A(θ0)
is of full column rank at θ0, then ϕ is unique and a continuous
function of θ in a neighborhood of θ0.
Proof. If A(θ0) has full column rank, A
TA is non-singular
at θ0. Therefore, in a small enough neighborhood of θ0, the
solution of the optimization problem can be written as
ϕ = (ATA)−1AT b,
which is continuous.
Now we start to prove Theorem 5.
Proof. Let us denote αis as the coefficients of the character-
istic polynomial p(x) = xn + αn−1x
n−1 + α0 of A. By the
Cayley-Hamilton theorem, if Hk,τ = Hτ , and αk,i = αi, then
the objective function is 0, which proves that αi is a solution
to (16) when Hk,τ = Hτ . Furthermore, the optimal value is 0.
Now suppose that α′i is solution to (16), denote the polynomial
p′(A) = An + α′n−1A
n−1 + · · ·+ α′0I.
Therefore, (16) implies that CAip′(A)AjB = 0 for all 0 ≤
i+ j ≤ 2n− 2. As a result, one can prove that

C
CA
· · ·
CAn−1

 p′(A) [B AB · · · An−1B] = 0.
Since we assume the system is both observable and control-
lable, the observability matrix and controllability matrix are
full column and row rank, respectively, which implies that
p′(A) = 0. Therefore, p′(A) coincides with the characteristic
polynomial since we assume that A has distinct eigenvalues.
Hence, the optimal solution to (16) is unique. As a result,
Hk must have full column rank, which implies that αk,is are
continuous function of Hk,0, · · · , Hk,3n−2 in a neighborhood
of (H0, · · · , H3n−2). Hence, if Hk,τ converges to Hτ , αk,i
converges to αi, which further implies that λk,i converges to
λi. As a result, rank(Vk) = n if λk,i = λi, and
rank(Vk ⊗ Im) = rank(Vk)× rank(Im) = nm,
which implies that Vk⊗Im is full column rank. Therefore,Ωk,i
are continuous function of λk,1, · · · , λk,n at a neighborhood
of λ1, · · · , λn, which implies that Ωk,i converges to Ωi.
Inference on W
This subsection is devoted showing how to infer W .
First, define Yk as
Yk ,
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
yty
T
t ,
one can think Yk is an estimate of W + U .
Then, let us define Uk,ij , which satisfies the following
recursive equation:
Uk+1,ij = λk,iλk,jUk,ij +ΩiUkΩ
T
j ,
and
Uk ,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Uk,ij .
Moreover, define
Wk = Yk −
1
k + 1
k∑
t=0
Ut.
The following theorem establishes the convergence of Wk.
Theorem 6. Suppose that (14) holds, then Wk converges to
W almost surely.
Proof. Please see the appendix.
7Before concluding this section, let us reconsider the opti-
mization problem (11). This problem involves two key param-
eters P and X . Accordingly, we further define
Pk =
∞∑
τ=0
(
n∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)T
W
−1
k
(
n∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
1
1− λk,iλk,j
ΩTk,iW
−1
k Ωk,j ,
and
Xk =
∞∑
τ=0
(
n∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)T
Xyy
(
n∑
i=1
λτk,iΩk,i
)
+
n∑
i=1
ΩTi Xyφ +Xφy
n∑
i=1
Ωi +Xφφ
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
1
1− λk,iλk,j
ΩTk,iXyyΩk,j +
n∑
i=1
ΩTi Xyφ
+Xφy
n∑
i=1
Ωi +Xφφ.
One can think Pk and Xk are the estimation of P and X
at time k, respectively. By the convergence of the parameters
Hk,τ , Wk, λk,i and Ωk,i, it is easy to prove that Pk and Xk
converges to P and X almost surely.
As a result, we have successfully estimated all the parame-
ters necessary to design the detector and watermarking signal,
as long as the only condition (14) is met.
B. Watermarking Signal and Detector Design
In this subsection, we shall show how to generate Uk, such
that (14) holds and how to design a detector to detect the replay
attack. Moreover, we provide a countermeasure for solving
the watermarking signal and detector design problem for high
dimension system.
Here, we provide the update equation of Uk:
Uk+1 = Uk,∗ +
δ
(k + 1)β
I, (17)
where δ is defined in (10) and Uk,∗ is the solution of the
following optimization problem
Uk,∗ =arg max
U≥0
tr(UPk)
subject to tr(UXk) ≤ δ,
and 0 ≤ β < 1. Then we use the following theorem to
establish the boundedness and convergence of Uk.
Theorem 7. Uk is bounded by
(k + 1)−βI ≤ Uk ≤ δ(Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ)
−1. (18)
Furthermore, if Pk converges to P and Xk converges to X ,
then
lim
k→∞
Uk = U,
where U is the solution of (11).
Proof. Notice that
Xk ≥
(
n∑
i=1
Ωi
)T
Xyy
(
n∑
i=1
Ωi
)
+
n∑
i=1
ΩTi Xyφ +Xφy
n∑
i=1
Ωi +Xφφ.
Hence, Xk ≥ Xφφ −XφyX−1yy Xyφ, which implies that
tr(Uk,∗
(
Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ
)
) ≤ δ. (19)
Note that for a positive semidefinite X , if tr(X) ≤ δ, X ≤
δI . Hence, (19) implies that
Uk,∗ ≤ δ
(
Xφφ −XφyX
−1
yy Xyφ
)−1
,
which proves the first inequality in (18). The second inequality
can be easily proved by (17).
The convergence can be proved by noticing that Uk,∗ is a
continuous function of Pk, Xk at a neighborhood of P ,X .
The detailed proof is omitted due to space limit.
Now we can establish that Uk converges to the optimal U .
Notice that there is no circular logic in our proof, as (18) holds
regardless of the inferred value Yk and Hk,τ . Therefore, the
convergence of Xk and Pk is guaranteed by Theorem 4, 5 and
6, which further implies the convergence of Uk.
Remark 7. It is worth noticing that during the inference on
the parameter and watermark signal and detector design, as
long as Uk satisfies the condition (14), Theorem 4 holds, i.e.,
Hk,τ converges to Hτ . Hence, Theorem 5 and 6 holds, i.e.,
λk,i, Ωk,i and Wk converge to λi, Ωi and W , respectively.
The convergence of these three parameters guarantees the
convergence of Pk and Xk, which can be used to derive that
Uk converges to U , the latter of Theorem 7.
Notice that the second term (k + 1)−βI on the RHS of
(17) is crucial for the “learning” mechanism. The reason is
that Uk,∗ is in general a rank 1 matrix and hence it does not
provide sufficient excitation to the system for us to identify the
necessary parameters. Conceptually, the problem we discussed
here is similar to the multi-arm bandit problem, where one
must balance exploration and exploitation. The (k + 1)−βI
term can be interpreted as an “exploration” term, as it provide
necessary excitation to the system in order for us to infer the
parameters. The Uk,∗ is the exploitation term, as it is optimal
under our current knowledge of the system parameters.
Consider the Neyman-Pearson detector in Theorem 1, the
detector can be designed as
gk =(yk − ϕ˜k−1)
T
W
−1
k (yk − ϕ˜k−1)− y
T
k (Wk + Uk)
−1
yk,
(20)
where ϕ˜k =
∑n
i=1 ϕ˜k,i, with
ϕ˜k,i = λk,iϕ˜k−1,i +Ωk,iφk.
8Design Technique For High Dimension Systems
This subsection is devoted to solving the watermarking
signal and detector design problem for high dimension system.
It is worth noticing that as complexity of the system, such as
the dimension, increases, time that “on-line” learning process
need to spend will be longer and the required resource will
correspondingly becomes more. Motivated by this idea, we
propose a novel technique to design the watermarking signal
and detector.
Here, we use low-dimensional system to estimate high-
dimensional system and to design corresponding physical
watermark and detector. For example, for an n-dimension
system (when the dimension of the system state is equal to
n, we use n-dimension for the rest of this paper), we employ
n′(n′ < n) to estimate this system. In other words, for the
real system, A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×p, and C ∈ Rm×n.
For the virtual system, we assume that the system is n′-
dimension, i.e., , A′, B′, C′ can be considered as A′ ∈ Rn
′×n′ ,
B′ ∈ Rn
′×p, C′ ∈ Rm×n
′
, respectively. Correspondingly, the
update equation can be written as:
U ′k+1 = U
′
k,∗ +
δ
(k + 1)β
I, (21)
where U ′k,∗ is the solution of the following optimization
problem
U ′k,∗ =arg max
U≥0
tr(UP ′k)
subject to tr(UX ′k) ≤ δ.
Here we write several parameters as U ′k+1, U
′
k,∗, P
′
k and X
′
k
since that are different from those of the real n-dimension
system due to the choice of technique.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, the performance of the proposed “learning”
procedure is evaluated. We would like to show the effec-
tiveness from two aspects of watermarking signal design and
detection performance. At the end of this section, we verify the
effectiveness of the technique proposed at the end of Section
IV.
Without loss of generality, we choose n = m = p = 2
and A, B, C are all randomly generated, with A stable. It
is assumed that X in (9), the covariance matrices Q and R
are equal to the identity matrix with proper dimensions. We
assume that δ in (11) is equal to 10 and β = 1/3.
A. The watermarking signal design
This subsection is devoted to showing the effectiveness of
the developed technique from the perspective of watermarking
signal designed. Fig. 1 shows ‖Uk − U‖F v.s. time k, where
U is the solution of the optimization problem of (10), and Uk,
generated through updating equation (17), is an estimation of
U . From Fig. 1, it can be seen that Uk converges to the optimal
covariance of the watermark signal φk , U , as time goes to
infinity.
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Fig. 1: ‖Uk − U‖F
B. The detection performance
This subsection shows the performance of the developed
technique from the perspective of detection performance. gk
is a function of time, and it has different forms in different
scenarios:
1) For the system with known parameters:
a) During the operation without replay attack, gk is equal
to (6).
b) During the operation when the replay attack occurs, gk
is
gk =
(
y′k − γk−1
)T
W
−1
(
y′k − γk−1
)
− y′Tk (W + U )
−1
y′k.
2) For the system with unknown parameters, during the
operation with replay attack, gk is equal to (20).
It is assumed that the adversary implements the replay attack
starting from time k = 101. Fig. 2, 3, 4 show gk versus time
k in different scenarios. Here, gn denotes the value of gk
during the normal operation when the replay attack is present
from time k = 101, gz denotes the value of gk during normal
operation without replay attack, and g denotes the value of gk
during the operation when the parameters of the system are not
available to the operator, in other words, these parameters are
inferred through the “on-line” learning technique. It is worth
noticing that time in these figures is just a piece of whole
operation process, which is chosen after running long enough
time.
Fig. 2 shows the value of gn and gz , the attacker records the
sensor readings from time 1 to 100 and replays them to the
controller from time 101 to 200. During the operation when
replay attack is present and absent. It can be observed that
there is a significant difference in the statistical distribution
of gn and gz when replay attack occurs. In other words, the
detector is effective.
Fig. 3 shows the value of gn and g. Similar to Fig. 2, the
attacker records the sensor readings and replays them. It is
easy to see that there is not an appreciable difference in these
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Fig. 2: gn and gz
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Fig. 3: gn and g
two scenarios. In other words, the performance of “on-line”
learning technique is close to that of the scenario when the
system parameters are available.
Fig. 4 shows the value of gn, g and gz together. We can
observe that there is a significant difference in the distribution
of g and gz, which means the “on-line” learning technique is
effective. From this figure, one can see the performance of the
“on-line” learning technique more clearly.
In order to verify the effectiveness of the “on-line” learning
technique proposed in this paper, we further employ the
detection rate metric. Here, we carry out a sample set of 500
simulations to calculate the detection rate of replay attack.
Here, we set ζ = J/0.9, where ζ is defined in (6), and J is
the LQG cost of the real system. Fig. 5 shows these curves as
follows.
For Fig. 5, the blue curve gz shows the detection rate of the
normal operation without replay attack. From this figure, the
detection rate is equal to 0, which means there is no attack
during all the process. The red curve gn shows the detection
rate of the normal operation when replay attack occurs at
0 50 100 150 200
−10
0
10
20
30
k
g k
g
gn
gz
Fig. 4: gz , gn and g
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Fig. 5: Detection rate
time k = 101. It is easy to see that the detection rate is
around 5.3% staring from time k = 101. In other words,
the replay attack can be detected. The green curve g shows
the scenario when the system parameters are not available to
the operator. We use the “on-line” learning technique to infer
corresponding parameters. One can notice that the detection
rate is approximately same as that of the case with known
system parameters. Therefore, this technique is effective for
the detection of replay attack.
Remark 8. For this simulation, when the dimension of the
system is 5× 5× 5, i.e., m = n = p = 5, the performance of
the proposed technique is satisfied when the number of update
is in general more than 100,000 where the time update interval
is 100. Furthermore, in the case of m = n = p = 10, the
number will become larger.
For the technique proposed at the end of Section V, we
assume that the real system is 100-dimension and m = p = 5,
here, a 5-dimension system is employed to evaluate the real
system. The following figures show the performance of this
10
technique. Here we write legends as gn,r, gz,r and ge since
they are different from those of the real n-dimension sys-
tem because of the employed method. One can think that
gn,r, gz,r and ge has corresponding meaning with gn, gz and g,
respectively.
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From Fig. 6, we can see that the covariance of watermarking
signal converges to the optimal one designed for the real
system. From Fig. 7 and 8, it is easy to know that gks of
real system in the presence of attack and estimation using the
technique proposed with attack are close in particular when
replay attack is present.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the detection problem of replay attack via
“physical watermarking” with known system parameters is
proposed to achieve the desired trade-off between the detec-
tion performance and control performance. Then we provide
an on-line “learning” technique for determining the optimal
detector and watermarking signals without the knowledge of
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Fig. 8: gn,r, ge and gz,r
system parameters. The simulation is carried out to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed technique.
There are still some problems that are not covered. For
example, one problem of interest is to investigate the rate of
the convergence of parameters. Another interesting problem
is to study how to improve the performance of the proposed
technique for the high dimension case in particular when the
time of computation and resources are limited. Also, how to
“learning” parameters of a linear dynamical system in the
presence of attack (The “learning” process is assumed without
attack in this paper) might be of interest.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
This section is devoted to proving Theorem 4. We only
prove it for the case where τ = 0. The τ > 0 case can be
proved following similar arguments and the details are omitted
due to space constraints.
Before proving theorem 4, we need to prove the following
lemmas which will be used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 3 can be seen as an extension of Isserlis’ theorem [28]
to the vector case. Lemma 4 is introduced to extend “A strong
law of large numbers for martingales” [29], which focuses on
the scalar case, to the matrix case.
Lemma 3. Suppose that ω, υ, ς, ξ are four jointly Gaussian
random vectors with zero mean and proper dimensions. The
following equations are true:
E
[
ωυT ςξT
]
=E
[
ωξT
]
E
[
υT ς
]
+ E
[
ωςT
]
E
[
υξT
]
+ E
[
ωυT
]
E
[
ςξT
]
, (22)
and
E
[
υT ςξT
]
= 0. (23)
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Proof: It is assumed that the vectors in Lemma 3 are n-
dimension column vectors. Then let us consider the corre-
sponding elements of the matrices on both hand sides in (22),
E
[[
ωυT ςξT
]
ij
]
=
n∑
k=1
E
[
ωiυ
T
k ςkξ
T
j
]
=
n∑
k=1
(
E
[
ωiξ
T
j
]
E
[
υTk ςk
]
+ E
[
ωiς
T
k
]
E
[
υkξ
T
j
]
+ E
[
ωiυ
T
k
]
E
[
ςkξ
T
j
])
= E
[
ωiξ
T
j
] n∑
k=1
E
[
υTk ςk
]
+
n∑
k=1
E
[
ωiς
T
k
]
E
[
υkξ
T
j
]
+
n∑
k=1
E
[
ωiυ
T
k
]
E
[
ςkξ
T
j
]
,
where
[
ωυT ςξT
]
ij
denotes the ith row, jth column element of
the matrix
[
ωυT ςξT
]
ij
, ωi, υ
T
k , ςk and ξ
T
j denote the ith, kth,
kth and jth element of ω, υT , ς and ξ, respectively. Hence,
the proof of (22) is completed.
Next let ω to be the identity matrix I with proper dimension,
we have that
E
[
ωυT ςξT
]
= E
[
IυT ςξT
]
= E
[
υT ςξT
]
=E
[
ξT
]
E
[
υT ς
]
+ E
[
ςT
]
E
[
υξT
]
+ E
[
υT
]
E
[
ςξT
]
= 0,
which completes the proof of (23).
Lemma 4. If Υn = Π0+Π1+ · · ·+Πn be a martingale such
that
∞∑
k=0
E ‖Πk‖
2
F
(k + 1)2
<∞,
where Πk(k = 0, 1, · · · , n) and Υn are all m × l matrices,
then
lim
n→∞
Υn
n+ 1
= 0 almost surely.
Proof: First, let us consider the martingale law of large
numbers [29], it can be rewritten as:
If Yn = x1 + x2 + · · · + xn is a martingale such that∑∞
k=0 E|xk|
2/(k + 1)2 < ∞, then limn→∞ Yn/(n + 1) = 0
almost surely.
Let Πk,ij denote the ith row, jth column element of the
matrix Πk, we have:
E ‖Πk‖
2
F = E

 m∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
|Πk,ij |
2

 .
Hence, if
∑∞
k=0
E‖Πk‖
2
F
(k+1)2 <∞, then for arbitrary i, j,
∞∑
k=0
E|Πk,ij |2
(k + 1)2
<
∞∑
k=0
E ‖Πk‖
2
F
(k + 1)2
<∞,
then limn→∞ Υn,ij/(n+ 1) = 0 almost surely. Hence,
lim
n→∞
Υn
n+ 1
= 0 almost surely.
which completes the proof.
The proof of theorem 4 is as follows.
Proof: Define the filtration Fk to be the σ-algebra
which is generated by the following random variables
{x0, φ0, φ0 · · · , φk−1, w0, · · · , wk−1, v0, · · · , vk}. It is easy to
see that both Uk and yk are measurable in the σ-algebra Fk.
Let us further define
Sk =
k∑
t=0
(ytφ
T
t−1U
−1
t−1 −H0),
where φk−1 = 0 if k < 1. The proof is divided into steps.
First, we need to prove that Sk is a martingale with respect
to the filtration {Fk}, i.e.,
E(Sk+1|Fk) = Sk, (24)
or in other words,
E(yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k |Fk) = H0.
Notice that yk+1 can be rewritten as
yk+1 =
k∑
t=0
Htφk−t +
k∑
t=0
CAtwk−t + CA
k+1x0 + vk+1,
and φk = U
1/2
k ζk. Therefore,
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k =
(
H0U
1/2
k ζk + ψk+1 + vk+1
)
ζTk U
−1/2
k ,
where
ψk+1 =
k∑
t=1
Htφk−t +
k∑
t=0
CAtwk−t + CA
k+1x0.
As it is known that Uk is measurable in the σ-algebra Fk
and ψk+1 is independent of ζk,
E(ψk+1ζ
T
k U
−1/2
k |Fk) = E(ψk+1ζ
T
k |Fk)U
−1/2
k = 0.
Since vk+1 is independent of Fk and ζk, we have
E(vk+1ζ
T
k U
−1/2
k |Fk) = 0.
Finally,
E(H0U
1/2
k ζkζ
T
k U
−1/2
k |Fk) = H0U
1/2
k E(ζkζ
T
k |Fk)U
−1/2
k = H0.
Therefore, (24) holds and we establish that Sk is a martingale
with respect to the filtration {Fk}.
Next we need to prove that
∞∑
k=0
E
∥∥yk+1φTk U−1k −H0∥∥2F
(k + 1)2
<∞. (25)
To this end, let us consider[
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
] [
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
]T
=yk+1φ
T
k U
−2
k φky
T
k+1 −H0U
−1
k φky
T
k+1
− yk+1φ
T
k U
−2
k H
T
0 +H0H
T
0 ,
(26)
where
yk+1φ
T
kU
−2
k φky
T
k+1 = Ξ1 + Ξ2 + Ξ
T
2 + Ξ3,
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where
Ξ1 = H0U
1/2
k ζkζ
T
k U
−1
k ζkζ
T
k U
1/2
k H
T
0 ,
Ξ2 = (ψk+1 + vk+1)ζ
T
k U
−1
k ζkζ
T
k U
1/2
k H
T
0 ,
Ξ3 = (ψk+1 + vk+1)ζ
T
k U
−1
k ζk(ψk+1 + vk+1)
T .
Now by Lemma 3, we can prove that
E(Ξ1|Fk) = H0UkH
T
0 tr(U
−1
k ) + 2H0H
T
0 ,
E(Ξ2|Fk) = 0,
E(Ξ3|Fk) = tr(U
−1
k )E(ψk+1ψ
T
k+1) + tr(U
−1
k )R.
Furthermore,
E(ψk+1ψ
T
k+1) = CΣC
T +
k∑
t=1
Ht (EUk−t)H
T
t .
Now let us consider the other terms in (26),
E(H0U
−1
k φky
T
k+1|Fk) = H0H
T
0 ,
E(yk+1φ
T
k U
−2
k H
T
0 |Fk) = H0H
T
0 ,
E(H0H
T
0 |Fk) = H0H
T
0 .
Hence, the following equation holds,
E
([
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
] [
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
]T
|Fk
)
=H0UkH
T
0 tr(U
−1
k ) + tr(U
−1
k )ψk+1ψ
T
k+1 + tr(U
−1
k )R
+H0H
T
0 .
Now if M/(k + 1)β ≤ Uk ≤M , we can conclude that
E
(∥∥yk+1φTkU−1k −H0∥∥2F
)
=tr
(
E
([
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
] [
yk+1φ
T
k U
−1
k −H0
]T))
=O
(
(k + 1)β
)
.
Since β < 1, according to the convergence condition of infinite
series, we know that the infinite sum on LHS of (25) is
bounded.
Therefore, by Lemma 4,
lim
k→∞
Sk
k + 1
= 0 almost surely,
which proves that Hk,0 converges to H0 almost surely.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
In order to prove theorem 6, we need to make use of the
following lemma:
Lemma 5. Suppose that ρk converges to ρ, where |ρ| < 1.
Furthermore, assume that limk→∞ a
′
k − ak = 0, where ak is
a bounded sequence. Then we have
lim
k→∞
b′k − bk = 0,
where bk and b
′
k satisfy the following recursive equation:
bk+1 = ρbk + ak, b
′
k+1 = ρkb
′
k + a
′
k,
with initial condition b−1 = b
′
−1 = 0.
Proof. Notice that
bk+1 − b
′
k+1 = (ρ− ρk)bk + ρk(bk − b
′
k) + (ak − a
′
k).
Since |ρ| < 1 and ak is bounded. We know that |bk| ≤
supk |ak|/(1−|ρ|) is also bounded. For any ǫ > 0, there exists
K , such that for any k ≥ K , |ρ− ρk| ≤ ǫ and |ak − a′k| ≤ ǫ.
Therefore, for k ≥ K , we have
|bk+1 − b
′
k+1| ≤ |ρk| × |bk − b
′
k|+ ǫ sup
k
|bk|+ ǫ
≤ (|ρ|+ ǫ)|bk − b
′
k|+ ǫ sup
k
|bk|+ ǫ.
Now since |ρ| < 1, we can choose ǫ small enough such that
|ρ|+ ǫ < 1, therefore,
lim sup
k→∞
|bk − b
′
k| ≤
ǫ
1− |ρ| − ǫ
(sup
k
|bk|+ 1).
Since ǫ can be arbitrarily small, bk − b′k → 0.
The proof of Theorem 6 is divided into 2 parts. First, by
Lemma 1:
k−1∑
t=0
HtUk−tH
T
t =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
k−1∑
t=0
λtiλ
t
jΩiUk−tΩ
T
j .
Therefore, by Lemma 5, Uk,ij converges to∑k−1
t=0 λ
t
iλ
t
jΩiUk−tΩ
T
j , which proves that
lim
k→∞
Uk −
k−1∑
t=0
HtUkH
T
t = 0 almost surely.
The next step is to prove that
lim
k→∞
Yk −
1
k + 1
k∑
τ=0
τ−1∑
t=0
HtUτ−tH
T
t =W almost surely,
which can be proved by Theorem 6 in [30] and examining the
expected value of Yk and its second moment. The details are
omitted due to space limit.
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